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Abstract:  Previous works on asymmetric information in asset markets tend to focus on  the
potential gains in the asset market itself.  We focus on the market for information and conduct
an experimental study to explore, in a game of finite but uncertain duration, whether
reputation can be an effective constraint on deliberate misinformation.  At the beginning of
each period, an uninformed potential asset buyer can purchase information, at a fixed price and
from a fully-informed source, about the value of the asset in that period. The informational
insiders cannot purchase the asset and are given short-term incentives to provide false
information when the asset value is low.  Our model predicts that, in accordance with the Folk
Theorem, Pareto-superior outcomes featuring truthful revelation should be sustainable.
However, this depends critically on beliefs about rationality and behavior.  We find that,
overall, sellers are truthful 89% of the time.  More significantly, the observed frequency of
truthfulness is 81% when the asset value is low.  Our result is consistent with both mixed-
strategy and trigger strategy interpretations and provides evidence that most subjects correctly
anticipate rational behavior. We discuss applications to financial markets, media regulation,
and the stability of cartels.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Decisions under uncertainty and asymmetry of information are a crucial element in
many real world problems and are at the core of research in many fields.  Individuals and firms
frequently must choose actions with little to guide them.  Sometimes relevant information can
be acquired at a cost from an informed agent who, unfortunately, may have incentives to
distort the truth.  Often the underlying asymmetry can be exploited to some financial
advantage by the insider, who can choose to sell or otherwise disseminate information to those
who could benefit from it.
There may be a temptation to strategically manipulate information to influence markets
and thus receive extra rents; however, usually the true state soon becomes common
knowledge.  The insider must weigh immediate and long-term considerations and the receiver
must assess the likelihood that private information is reliable when deciding whether to buy or
use it.  A major issue is whether a concern for one’s reputation and ensuing expected future
gains can serve as an effective disincentive against distortion, even when the deception has
immediate benefits.
An important regulatory issue is whether the possibility of such manipulation warrants
intervention in the public interest.  The potential abuse of insider information has been
presented as an argument to regulate not only financial and commodity asset markets, but also
information markets such as the press.
1  We examine an information “market” embedded in the
context of an asset purchase decision and test whether theoretical cooperative outcomes
supported by the Folk Theorem can be obtained in the laboratory.  These outcomes require a
set of beliefs about players’ rationality and behavior, so the result is not obvious ex ante.   Our
empirical finding is that reputation can be an effective constraint on the distortion of insider
information.
                                               
1See Reichman (1993). For example, section 16 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act forbids “short-
swing profits” and the 1990 Securities Enforcement Remedies Act extends criminal liability to insider
trading of information An insider is defined to be a person possessing non-public information and
short-swing profits are defined as illegal profiting from using non-public information.3
Using the Kreps and Wilson (1982) approach, we construct an experimental game
where we investigate the extent to which reputation actually deters the manipulation of
information.  In our framework, the asset value in each period is stochastic and is either high
or low, with the parameters set so that the expected gain from making an uninformed asset
purchase is zero.  An informed agent (G) can sell information to an uninformed potential asset
buyer (F) at an exogenously fixed and strictly positive price, while it is common knowledge
that the true asset value will be revealed to all at the end of the period. G also receives a bonus
if the information buyer also buys the asset.
2  This gives G an incentive to report a high asset
value regardless of the true state.
However, we model the environment as a finitely-repeated game of uncertain duration,
where it is common knowledge that F can only obtain advance information from G.  This
design is intended to simulate a case where G’s potential profits from manipulating the asset
price and trading in the security are negligible compared to the potential profits available from
information sales.
3  The intuition is that a trader (or trader aggregate) F has much greater
financial resources than G has available for her own trading.  One could imagine G to be a
financial journalist or guru, while F is some subset of the uninformed public.
There is considerable theoretical and experimental literature on insider trading in asset
markets, where decision-makers can extract information from informed players by either
purchasing it or observing actions.  Central issues are the credibility of the insiders and the
mechanism by which information is disseminated in the market.  The usual conclusion is that
access to private information generates the incentives and the ability to manipulate markets
                                               
2This bonus is not paid by the buyer, but can be viewed as a “kickback” or commission paid by the
seller of the security.
3This assumption is also made in van Bommel (1998), where G has a very low “trading capacity.”4
through strategically-distorted announcements.
4  However, most studies focus on the market-
clearing price of the primary asset market, with all gains and losses occurring in this market.
5
Some models examine the information market, but still permit the insider to trade in
the asset market.  Benabou and Laroque (1992) suggest that the insider will make distorted
announcements, as the noise in the main market prevents outsiders from being certain whether
the insider's message was an blameless error or an attempt to manipulate them.  On the other
hand, van Bommel (1998) finds that it is optimal for informed traders to disseminate accurate
rumors after taking a position.  Admati and Pfleiderer (1986) do study a monopolistic market
for information where the informed agent can only increase revenues by manipulating the price
for information; however, here the price of information is endogenous.  They find that the
agent charges a price so high that relatively few people buy information.
Experimental markets with asymmetric information usually focus on behavior in the
asset market.
6  Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988), Copeland and Friedman (1987, 1991, 1992),
Friedman (1993), and Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott (1984) examine efficiency in relation to some
form of rational expectations equilibrium.  Sunder (1992) does investigate information markets
where information is either sold to each voluntary buyer at a fixed price or auctioned off, but
this information must be accurate. We are unaware of any previous experimental research
where an insider cannot directly trade an asset, but can sell potentially distorted information
about the asset at a fixed price.
Our focus is on the veracity of information sellers when they may have an immediate
reason to lie, but are constrained only by reputation.  The trade-off is the immediate gain from
inducing the purchase of a worthless asset versus potential loss of future revenue when the
                                               
4Credibility and manipulation have been formalized through models of strategic information
transmission in which a sender observes the state of nature and then transmits a message to a
receiver, who then chooses an action that determines payoffs (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Sobel,
1985; Benabou and Laroque, 1992).
5We can interpret this story as saying that information conveyed by insiders is a free good and so the
market-clearing price in the market for information is zero (either because it is costless to produce it
or because there is always excess supply).
6Sunder (1995) presents an excellent survey.5
manipulation is revealed. The value of a reputation for honesty is the key determinant.  Yet,
reputation only matters under certain sets of beliefs about rationality. Our experiment tests
whether these beliefs are strong enough for a good reputation to have significant value.
The main result of the paper suggests that the insiders' incentive to manipulate
information is substantially limited by the expectation of future revenues. We find that even
when the true asset value is low, sellers provide accurate information with an 81% probability,
generally resisting the temptation to secure an immediate commission by lying.  This ex post
observed probability is high enough to make it optimal to purchase information.  We also
observe considerable efficiency in the asset market, as measured by the overall performance of
the assets purchased.  We briefly describe several policy implications for financial markets,
media behavior, cartel stability, and political economy.
2. THE MODEL
An individual trades an asset whose return is contingent upon the state of the nature S
˛{-1,1}. The asset pays r if S = 1 and zero if S = -1. Each of these outcomes has probability
one half, and the outcome becomes known to all only at the end of the period. The asset has
value in exactly one period and can be bought at the beginning of the period for a price y.
Assuming that individuals are risk neutral and absent private information, there is a market for
this asset as long as y <= r/2.  We set y = r/2.
At the beginning of each period, an insider (a journalist, a consultant or a message
sender) privately observes either S or a signal that predicts the state of the nature with
probability one.  He can offer to sell, at a price p,  information about this state to an individual
trading in the asset market. Furthermore, if an individual does buy the asset, the insider gets a
bonus given by q (imagine that the sender is commissioned by the seller of the asset). This
information structure is common knowledge.
        The buyer learns S after the trading period, and consequently knows if there has been
manipulation of information. The insider knows that any attempt to manipulate information is6
detected with probability one after the trading period.  Figure 1 shows the extensive form for
this game. Nature chooses S.  Without observing nature's move, the buyer B chooses between
buy information (Bi) and not buy information and buy asset (Ni). Given the opportunity, the
sender observes S and decides between announcing S = 1 and S = -1. The buyer observes the
sender's announcement and decides between buying the asset (Ba) and not buying the asset
(Na).7
2.1. One-shot game
Suppose the message technology is such that the sender cannot lie. The expected
payoff for the buyer is then r/4 - p, given that he does not buy the asset if the sender
announces S = -1. As long as p < r/4, the buyer always buys information. The seller gets p+q if
S = 1 and p if S = -1.
However, matters are very different if we permit the seller to lie.  Now the seller has an
incentive to state that S = 1, independently of the observed S. By doing so, the seller keeps
alive the chance to receive q+p rather than just p.
Let us solve the game backwards.  From Figure 1, if the sender announces S = -1 then
the buyer does not buy the asset. If the sender announces S = 1 he believes with probability A
that S = 1.  In this case, he buys the asset if A > 1/2.  When the sender observes S = -1
announcing S = 1 strictly dominates announcing S = -1.  Then, at equilibrium, A = 1/2.  Paying
the insider provides no useful information. The expected payoff from choosing Bi is -p and the
expected payoff from choosing Ni is zero.  Thus, Ni is preferred to Bi.
The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is described by the buyer
choosing Ni; the sender announcing S=1 if information is bought and S=-1 is observed; the
buyer believing with probability 1/2 that S=1 when the seller announces S=1 and with
probability 1/2 that S=-1 when the seller announces S=1; and the buyer randomizing between
Ba and Na. The buyer should anticipate that the seller always lies when S = -1 and so knows
the sender's message does not convey any information. He decides not to buy information and
either buys the asset or not, depending on risk aversion and whether he feels lucky. Both the
insider and buyer have expected payoffs of zero and so both are worse-off from the situation
where the buyer purchases the information and the sender is honest.  The problem here is that
the sender cannot credibly commit himself to always tell the truth.8
2.2. Repeated game
Consider a repeated game where buyer and seller are to play forever.  Can the sender
credibly commit himself to consistently tell the truth? The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated
games says that there exists a minimum discount factor above which cooperative strategies can
be supported as a Nash equilibrium.
7  This result can also be invoked for finitely repeated
games with an uncertain number of rounds (Benoit and Krishna, 1985, 1987; van Damme,
1991).  Suppose the buyer uses a grim trigger strategy: if he discovers he has been
manipulated, he never buys information again.  Otherwise, he always buys information.  When
S = -1 is observed, the sender has to decide whether to lie.
8 By reporting the truth, the seller
expects to earn p+z(p+q/2), where z represents the expected number of subsequent periods
9
and p+q/2 is the future expected earnings per period; if he lies, he gets p+q.  As long as z >
q/(p+q/2), the sender always tells the truth.
        Two cases are straightforward: (1) suppose p is near zero and q is large (the insider's
gains come from the asset market): the critical value for z is 2 and for any z < 2 the seller lies
and there is no market for information; (2) suppose p is large and q is zero (the insider's gains
come from the market for information): the seller always tells the truth because he wants to
maintain the demand for information.  The parameter values used in the experiment are p = 50
and q = 40, so that the critical value of z is given by 4/7; that is, for any z < 4/7 the seller
reports the asset value to be high even when it is actually low, so there is no market for
information.
2.2.a. Finite game
        In a finite repeated game, there is an unraveling problem.  We know that the unique
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the meta-game is for the seller to lie (if S = -1 occurs) and for
                                               
7Of course, even if the sufficient condition is satisfied, the set of possible Nash equilibria is infinite.
8We assume throughout this section that a sender accurately reports a true high asset value with
probability 1.  The observed probability was .97.
9 In principle z should also be discounted over time.  However, in the experiment d = 1.9
the buyer not to buy information. Using backwards induction, the seller will always state S = 1
in the last period T; since the buyer anticipates this, he will not buy information in this period.
In period T-1, the seller knows that he cannot be punished next period because the buyer will
not buy information in any case, so he again always states S = 1 in this period.  Once again,
this is anticipated by the potential buyer; we can generalize the argument to the first period and
so cannot improve on the equilibrium of the stage game.
  Suppose instead that there are s periods played for certain, after which there is a
probability (hazard rate) P > 0 that the session ends after each round, so that p(T+1) = 1-P  "
T ‡ s.  Note that at any point after period s, the expected number of further periods is 1/P.  In
this case the part of the session with stochastic duration is expected to be a finite game of T =
1/P periods, but the game cannot be solved backwards as before because the final period is
uncertain.
        Define z = T-1. Suppose the buyer uses a grim trigger strategy, defined as buying
information if and only if there have been no observed false asset value reports. From the
preceding section and the above definition of z, we can say that for any T > (p+3q/2)/(p+q/2),
the sender always tells the truth.  If the buyer plays the grim trigger strategy and the critical
value of z is 4/7,  we argue that if players expect to play for two or more periods, the sender
always tells the truth.
        We obtain a similar result with a transitory punishment phase.  Assume that the buyer
punishes the sender for N periods if deceived. The sender compares the payoff from being
honest for T periods, p+(T-1)(p+q/2), with the payoff from lying and being punished for N
periods given that S = -1 has been observed, p+q+(T-N-1)(p+q/2). As a consequence, as long
as N > q/(p+q/2), the sender is honest.
2.2.b. Mixed strategies
An alternative view of this repeated game is to assume that the seller randomizes
between announcing S = 1 and S = -1 when S = -1 is observed in the meta-game.  Define j as10
the probability that S = 1 is announced when S = -1 is observed. If the receiver purchases
information, he receives r/4 - jr/4 - p each period.  He forms an opinion about j based on
observing either historical behavior or a randomizing device.  As long as j is less than 1-4p/r
the buyer buys information and then buys the asset if and only if the message states that S = 1.
The sender's payoff per period is p+q/2+jq/2 if j is less than 1-4p/r and zero if j is
greater than 1-4p/r (since there is no market for information). If the buyer’s strategy is to
purchase information with non-negative expected net value, based on his beliefs about the
value of j, he will do so if and only if he believes  j £ 1-4p/r.  In this case, it is optimal for the
sender to randomize with j = 1 - 4p/r.  When p = 50 and r = 320, j is given by 0.375. In other
words, as long as the sender tells the truth with a probability greater than 0.625 when S = -1 is
observed (and always tells the truth when S = 1), there is a market for information.  Before S
is observed, we can say that the truth should be conveyed to the buyer with probability 0.8125.
        We must be careful in defining the randomization mechanism; that is, how the sender sets
j. If the buyer is not able to observe and verify the sender's randomization, we can have j=1-
4p/r and yet the sender’s message will always be “high.”  To make sure that the buyer's belief j
is supported at the equilibrium we need a verification mechanism.
A possible example of a verification mechanism is for the buyer to argue that for each
ten periods, he should observe the seller lying 5j periods.  For the example where j=0.375, we
have 5j=1.875.  In other words, if the buyer observes the seller lying for two periods in a row
of ten periods, the buyer knows his belief that j=1-4p/r is wrong and he stops buying
information. There are two implications from this result.  First, we should observe the seller
lying at most once in each ten periods; second, information is purchased even after the seller
lies for the 1st time.
There is a small but potentially important caveat to this result.  It may be the case that
people have an aversion to being manipulated, over and above any pecuniary considerations.
This could be a rationale for playing the grim trigger strategy.  If such an aversion is present it11
will be prudent for the seller to choose a smaller j, according to the degree of distaste for being
manipulated.
2.3. Optimism and pessimism
        The likelihood of S = 1 at period T is independent from the state of the world at period
T-1. Moreover, at each period, a coin is thrown to determine the state of the world and the
probability of S=1 is 1/2.  We distinguish optimism and pessimism as beliefs that the likelihood
of S=1 is not 1/2: given the observation of the world at T-1, one may be optimistic or
pessimistic about the world at period T.  These beliefs are taken as exogenous to the model.
Consider the finite repeated version of the game where T is the expected number of periods.
        Start by analyzing the seller’s decision.  Suppose she thinks that S = 1 occurs with
probability = k.  For k > 1/2, we say that the seller is optimistic and for k<1/2 we say that the
seller is pessimistic. Applying results derived before, cooperation is achievable if
T>[p+(k+1)q]/[p+kq].  Observe that the right-hand side of the expression decreases with k: it
is easier to achieve cooperation if the seller is optimistic.
        Conversely, consider the case of the buyer. The payoff from buying information is kr/2-p.
The payoff from not buying information is max{(k-1/2)r,0}, where the first term refers to the
case where the asset is bought and the second to the situation where the asset is not bought.
The buyer buys information if 2p/r £ k £ 1-2p/r (for p/r< 1/4). In the case of our example,
0.3125 £ k £ 0.6875.  Summarizing, we can say that the likelihood of a market for information
existing increases with the degree of optimism exhibited by the seller, as long as the buyer is
neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic.
2.4. A Note on Bankruptcy
In the previous discussion we have implicitly assumed that a buyer cannot become
bankrupt.  This is equivalent to the case where a buyer has an infinite debt capacity. This
convenient assumption is translated into the experiment by giving the buyers a substantial12
initial endowment, so that bankruptcy does not play an important role in the game. However,
for the sake of completeness, we further discuss the game when a liquidity constraint is
binding.
Consider the extreme case where the buyer becomes bankrupt if he buys the asset
when S=-1. Here, the seller has less incentive to lie. The possibility of bankruptcy works as a
grim trigger strategy mechanism: if the seller lies to the buyer, the buyer will never buy again
because he does not have the money to do so. So the possibility of bankruptcy should favor
cooperation. In a sense, the possibility of bankruptcy is good for both players because it makes
more credible for the buyer to use a grim trigger strategy and for the seller to be honest from
day one.
In the context of mixed strategies, the possibility of bankruptcy puts pressure on the
seller to opt for a smaller j. Consider the case where buyer and seller expect to play for two
periods. When bankruptcy is not binding, the expected payoff if the buyer buys information
and the seller announces S=1 when S=-1 with probability j is 2[r(1-j)/4 -p].  When bankruptcy
is binding, the expected payoff is (2-j/2)[r(1-j)/4 -p], that is, the expected payoff is smaller than
when bankruptcy is not binding. As a consequence, we can say that buying information yields
a smaller payoff.
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The experiment was conducted at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.
Participants were undergraduate students with majors in economics, business, or the
humanities.  There were a total of 78 subjects in 6 separate sessions.  Average earnings were
approximately $10 and the sessions averaged about 75 minutes.  Participants were seated in
carrels separated by dividers, so that information and choices were private.
The precise instructions used are shown in Appendix 1.  Sellers were clustered on one
side of the room, with buyers on the other.  It was common knowledge that each buyer was
paired with one seller for the duration of the experiment.  This duration was stochastic - after13
period 10, an eight-sided die was tossed.
10  If the outcome was 1 or 2, the experiment ended
immediately.  Otherwise, we proceeded to the next round, after which the die was tossed
again.  Thus, after period 10 there was always a 75% chance that there would be another
period and the expected number of future periods is always 4.  The results indicate that this
approach was successful in preventing unraveling, even in late periods.
11  The longest session
lasted 18 periods.
Prior to each period, each buyer chose whether to purchase information and indicated
this choice on a decision form.   A coin was flipped in the sellers' area, so that the sellers could
see the true asset value for that period, but the buyers could not.  At this point, the information
purchase decisions were distributed to the sellers.  If the buyer wished to purchase
information, the seller indicated a value on a separate sheet.  It was common knowledge that
sellers were not constrained to report accurately.  If no information was purchased, this sheet
was left blank.  These asset value reports were passed out to the corresponding buyers, who
then indicated on another sheet whether to purchase the asset in that period.  Finally, the asset
purchase decision slips were given to the information sellers and the asset value was revealed
to everyone.  All of these decision forms are shown in Appendix 2.
Buyers were endowed with 630 pesetas, in addition to the 500 peseta show-up fee
received by all.  Each information purchase cost 50 pesetas, this amount being transferred
from the buyer's account to the seller's account.  The asset cost 160 pesetas and had a value of
either 0 or 320 pesetas, depending on the result of the coin toss.  If a buyer purchased
information and also purchased the asset,  the seller received a bonus of 40 pesetas (for 90
pesetas total).  This bonus was 25% of the cost of the asset.  If no information was bought, the
                                               
10Marimon and Sunder (1993) adapt an infinite OLG model to a finite experiment, using a forecast
technique.  They credit Lim, Prescott, and Sunder (1993) for their design.  To our knowledge,  the
first use  of a stochastic termination was in Cason (1995)
11It should be clear that there are some limitations to this technique.  It is necessary to estimate the
ending time for a session when recruiting subjects.  Even if this were not so, subjects form
expectations about the time a session will end.  If the session gets "too close" to this time, participants
may not believe that the experimenter will continue the session indefinitely.  To help minimize this
problem, sessions were advertised as two hours in length, well in excess of the actual time needed.14
seller received 0.  These parameter values were common knowledge and were chosen to give
roughly equal payoffs to buyers and sellers if information was always purchased and reporting
was always truthful.15
4. RESULTS
The results indicate that reputation is generally a stronger force than the temptation to
manipulate buyers for immediate reward.  Fully detailed results for the 6 sessions can be found
in Appendix 3.  A summary is presented in Table 1:
Table 1 - Information sellers' behavior
Asset Value Periods Sales Truth
High 41 166 161 (97%)
Low 41 164 133 (81%)
Total 82 330 294 (89%)
When the asset value was low (high), information sellers reported the value with an 81%
(97%) probability.  Overall, the truth was stated 89% of the time.  Ex post, a buyer could
expect to earn money by buying information and treating it as accurate, since [1/2*(.97*160) -
1/2*(.19*160)] - 50 = 12.4.  An uninformed player who guessed high (or low) asset value
every time would have earned 0.
Appendix 4 shows that the percentage of truth-telling when the asset value is low does
not change much over time.  This supports the conclusion that little unraveling occurs, as the
proportion of honesty when the asset value is low is still 77% for periods 11-18.
12  A case by
case analysis of the behavior for the 37 (of 39 potential) sellers who actually sell information
finds that 14 always told the truth, 13 lied once, and 10 lied more than once.  Six buyers never
again bought information after being told a lie and 5 others stopped buying after two false
reports.  This is consistent with the view that nearly half of the subjects (11 of 23) played
either a grim trigger or near-grim trigger strategy (allow one lie), while others employed
                                               
12However, it should be noted that there are other factors involved here, so that this is not conclusive.
Specifically, buyers' eventually stop buying information from manipulative sellers, so that the less
honest sellers make fewer sales over time.16
temporary punishment phases.  There was no punishment for only 6 of the 33 lies not
occurring in the last period.  Generally, temporary punishment phases lasted  for 2-4 periods.
Another measure of the effectiveness of this information market is the observed
likelihood that a buyer’s decision to buy (or not buy) the asset is optimal.  We find that 403 of
543 asset decisions, or 74%,  were correct.  While this is a substantial improvement over the
50% expectation absent information purchase, it is far from perfect.  The asset market
“efficiency” would be higher if information were purchased more frequently.  While the
percentage of truth-telling was high enough to support consistent information buying, in fact
the overall purchase rate of information was only 61%.  Nonetheless, nonparametric tests
show that our market for information significantly improves the accuracy of asset purchase
decisions. Using all asset decisions, we have c
2 = 67.66, p << .01. A binomial test on
individual participants’ success rates also rejects the null hypothesis of equality at p << .01 (Z
= 4.81),  as more than 50% of the asset purchase decisions were correct for 34 of 39 buyers.
13
4.1 Discussion
In the model presented, both the trigger-strategy equilibrium and the mixed-strategy
equilibrium are subgame-perfect.  In the case of the mixed-strategy equilibrium, we must also
address the question of whether a suggested steady-state equilibrium can be started-up.  Why
should the receiver buy information at time 1 given that there is no previous history and that
there is some probability that the seller will lie?  If a credible randomizing mechanism can be
observed, this presents no problem.  However, if a probability estimate can only be made
based on historical behavior, the likelihood of an honest report is unclear at time 1.  Under the
assumption that a receiver wishes to maximize the total expected profits over the span of the
repeated game, the receiver should explore the informational resources available, even if his a
priori estimate of j is quite high.
14
                                               
13Two buyers made correct asset purchase decisions exactly 50% of the time.
14The data show that 37 of 39 potential information buyers did purchase information on at least one
occasion.17
A related point concerns the use of some form of trigger strategy.  Since there is no
previous communication or history between players, there is no obvious ex ante  reason for a
sender to believe that a receiver is following a trigger strategy.  However, there may be some
perceived social norms that: 1) people assume that others are honest until they are given
evidence to the contrary; and 2) people react adversely when they learn that they have been
deceived.  These two conditions describe a trigger strategy and the degree of the adverse
reaction to deception influences the length of the punishment phase.  If a sender believes that
the receiver is playing a trigger strategy with a sufficiently long punishment phase, he should
never lie.
15  On the other hand, if the sender believes that the receiver buys information if and
only if it has positive expected value, the mixed-strategy equilibrium with the maximal j is
optimal for the sender.  If the sender is uncertain of the receiver’s type of strategy, he would
select a value of j between 0 and the maximum permitted by the Folk Theorem.
In fact, we find that the observed value for j is .19, near the midpoint of the possible
range of [0, .375] for which there should be a market for information.  This may reflect the
sender’s uncertainty regarding the receiver’s response to deception.  In fact, it appears that
receivers do generally punish deception, at least temporarily.  It seems likely that less
uncertainty concerning players’ strategies and rationality would lead to more consistency in
behavior and greater efficiency.
The relatively low rate of information purchase may seem a bit surprising at first, but is
easier to understand with a bit of reflection. For an information seller to be honest,  he must
either have a taste for truth-telling or believe that, while a buyer will continue to buy
information if he expects it to be accurate, he will stop buying (at least temporarily) if he
discovers he has been deceived.  However, consider the thought process of a prospective
buyer.  First, he knows that information reports may be inaccurate and he may have an
                                               
15This case includes the possibility of an “irrational” response to deception (non-maximization of
material payoffs), perhaps driven by the psychological disutility of being a victim of such deception.18
aversion to being at the mercy of an anonymous person.  Second,  he must believe that the
seller is not only rational, but also believes that the buyer is rational.
The necessity for higher order beliefs makes the purchase of information less likely,
given the abundant experimental evidence of subjects' finite depth of reasoning.
16  In addition,
as the willingness to purchase information decreases as |k - 1/2| increases, the observed
underpurchase can be justified on the grounds of optimism and pessimism alike.
Finally, we would expect unraveling if senders become “nervous” as either the time T
increases or as low outcomes seem to be too prevalent. However, we do not observe any
dramatic unraveling, although there is some evidence that sellers get nervous.  This suggests
that the sender’s subjective expectations for the remaining duration of the session and the
likelihood of future outcomes do not fall below the joint threshold values.  If it was anticipated
that this would not be the case at any point in the session, the market should unravel all the
way back to the first period.  It appears that this element of the design was successful.
5. APPLICATIONS
Our model and our results lend themselves to a number of applications.  We briefly
present some of these and develop the application to financial markets and business law. Each
application is contingent on the less-informed being able to verify ex post   the accuracy of the
information or news that they receive.  The model and the experiment are based on a one-to-
one relationship and, in that sense, our considerations refer to a small market for information
(small in the number of agents). In the applications below, it is possible to argue that the
number of buyers and sellers is usually small, each buyer and seller having a significant market
power.  Information in these markets is not usually provided competitively, as it is difficult for
one to shop for privileged information.
5.1 Stability of cartels
                                               
16 One example of this can be seen in the Nagel (1995) guessing game.19
Asymmetry of information should not affect the stability of a cartel. The members with
more information have a reduced incentive to manipulate information as long as they are paid
by other members of the cartel. Side payments from those with less information to those with
more information contributes to the stability of the cartel.20
5.2. Media behavior
As long as the gains from setting a given political agenda or defaming public figures
are not large relative to the revenues from selling newspapers, the market is self-regulating.
Defamation and partisan oriented news occur, but are limited by economic considerations.
The result is also applicable to financial journalists or brokers who may be offered bribes by
companies to tout their offerings to the public.
5.3 Political economy
Given at least a medium-run horizon, voters' ability to eventually learn the truth gives
politicians incentives to reduce their likelihood of manipulating public information, in order to
cover their vested interests. In addition, any long-run concerns about how history will record
their performance (perhaps not an insignificant factor) contribute to a self-regulated political
market. This is not to imply that there is no manipulation of information,  but rather that
regulating the political market may be inefficient.
5.4 Financial markets and business law
        We find that, in a repeat-game situation with no fixed end, if the gains from
manipulating information are not extremely large relative to the revenues from selling
information, the market can actually be self-regulated.  Self-regulation does not eliminate
manipulation altogether but reduces its likelihood.  In comparison, regulation by a third
party may be inefficient because the gains in avoiding manipulation are not large, and
monitoring and enforcement costs are incurred.
        There are implications for the regulation of insider information exchange and criminal
liability.  One criminal offense is that the sender gets a kickback.  Here our result suggests
that unless the punishment is very tough, we should expect little impact from regulation.
Other offenses include selling inside information and manipulating information; while
punishment may reduce incentives to exchange this information, the market itself may21
provide disincentives for manipulation.  Thus, criminal regulation may have limited marginal
effectiveness on distortions in the market for insider information.
        In the context of mandatory disclosure, we can think of our model as Coffee´s story
(1984), as we address the interval between the disclosure and the market absorption of
information (the asset value becomes common knowledge at the end of each period).
Coffee suggests that the time interval is sufficient to assure profitable trade and satisfy the
mandate of the laws. Our results support this view.
The main legal theory on regulating inside information seems to be the
misappropriation theory that rejects what has been called "the Wall Street honor code" by
which individuals trade inside information in the shadow of the law. As Painter, Krawiec and
Williams (1998) have pointed out, the regulatory agency finds the honor code difficult to
break.  The results suggest an explanation for this  observation: the honor code is induced by
reputation gains and there is virtually no transaction cost, since the code is not negotiated.
The code emerges "spontaneously" as insiders learn that manipulating information induces a
loss of future gains, and so buyers find it useful to buy information.
The legal policy of conditioning criminal liability on the existence of a fiduciary
relationship seems appropriate in the context of our results.
17 Specifically, the more intense
is a relationship (in sense of duration), the less problematic is information manipulation and
the more likely inside information will be purchased and used.  An interesting point is to
question liability in terms of who solicits information and who provides it.  It seems that the
legal practice is to be more lenient with those providing the information than with those
asking for information.
18
In terms of our game, we could rationalize the legal practice by observing that the
buyer makes the first decision (whether to buy information). But taking into account how
the game operates, it would seem more sensible to be stricter with the seller.  By being
                                               
17 See DeMarzo, Fishman, and Hagerty (1998)
18 See  United States v. O'Hagan, where an attorney used confidential client information to trade in
the stock market.22
lenient with the buyer and strict with the seller, the regulator is providing an extra incentive
for the seller to manipulate information: it is more likely that both are playing a one-shot
game (given that if detected and punished, the seller is basically out of the market).  The
consequence is that buying information is less attractive, as intended by the regulator.
Note that it is easier to legally constrain the seller from being in the market than the
buyer, as the seller is someone in a privileged position and so is much easier to detect and
punish.  As in Brudrey (1979), our model suggests that inside trading is inequitable because
it gives insiders a monopoly on the use of corporate information.  However, following the
criticism of Carlton and Fischel (1983) and Haddock and Macey (1987, 1988), this paper
points out that reputation reduces inequity in the sense that the monopoly power is reduced
by the incentive to reveal accurate information.
        In conclusion, if the main concern of the analysis is manipulation of information, the
results presented are optimistic because individuals seem to be fairly honest even in presence
of commissions. In contrast, if the main concern is the existence of a market for insider
information, the results presented are quite negative because demand and supply exists even
when some dishonesty is likely.
6. CONCLUSION
The results indicate that it may not be necessary to regulate environments where there
is an information asymmetry.  Even in a finite game, sellers’ behavior appears to be
constrained by reputation and foregone future earnings.  Beliefs about rationality are sufficient
to sustain more Pareto-efficient outcomes than are possible in a one-shot game.  As we have
limited the opportunity for insider gains in the asset market, we find that manipulation is not a
major issue in our repeated-game setting.
Our model captures the essence of the observed behavior. There is a substantial degree
of information under-purchase, probably due to the more stringent rationality beliefs required
on the part of the buyers.  Sellers appear to be following either mixed strategies or expect23
buyers to follow grim trigger or near-grim trigger strategies (27/37 sellers lied one or less
times).  The limited number of periods makes it impossible to distinguish between these two
explanations; however, it seems likely that there are sellers in each of these categories.  The
observed likelihood for honestly reporting a low asset value (.81) is higher than the Folk
Theorem’s threshold value (.625), perhaps reflecting sellers’ uncertainty about whether buyers
are following some form of trigger strategy or simply purchase information when the
perceived expected value is positive.
In many real contexts, our results have immediate applicability.  While government
intervention and regulation may be advisable in many instances, the potential for self-
regulation of information markets is definitely present.  Sometimes agents realize that it is
worthwhile to maintain a reputation for honesty.24
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APPENDIX 1 - INSTRUCTIONS
Thank you for participating in this experiment.  Each participant will receive 500 pesetas as a
show-up fee, in addition to his or her accumulated account balance at the end of the
experiment.  Each person will be paid individually and privately.
People will be matched in anonymous pairs, so that no one will know with whom s/he is
paired.  People will be randomly divided into two groups:  Information buyers (B) and
information sellers (S). There will be a number of periods in this experiment.  Each B will be
paired with the same S in every period of the experiment.
Earnings:
In every period, each B will have a choice of whether to purchase an asset which has two
possible payoffs in that period and only in that period.  The cost of this asset is 160 pesetas.  In
each period, a coin will be flipped to determine the value of the asset.  If the coin result is
“heads”, the asset has a value of 320 pesetas.  If the coin result is “tails”, the asset has a value
of 0 pesetas. In the next period, each B will again choose whether to buy a new asset.  Once
again, the price of the asset will be 160 pesetas and its value will be determined by the result of
the coin flip in that round.
When the coin is flipped, the results of the coin flip will be shown to all information
sellers (S) and only to the information sellers.  Thus, each S knows the value of the asset.
In each round, before each B makes a decision about whether to purchase the asset, s/he will
have the opportunity to purchase information about the asset’s value from the S with whom
s/he is paired.  A form is provided for this purpose for each round; the choice to purchase or
not purchase information will be communicated to the S for each B.  In each round, the cost of
this information is 50 pesetas, which would be transferred from B’s account to S’s account if
information is purchased by B.  Each B will be endowed with 630 pesetas (separate from
the show-up fee) with which s/he may purchase assets and/or information.
In each period, if B chooses to purchase information, S may tell the truth about the asset value
or may give false information to B. A form is provided for this purpose for each round and will
be delivered to each B who chooses to purchase information.  If you purchase information
in a round, please take care that other B’s do not see this information.  If B does
purchase information and B then decides to buy the asset, S receives a bonus of 40 pesetas
(25% of the asset cost), in addition to the 50 pesetas for the sale of the information; otherwise,
S receives only the proceeds, if any, from the sale of information.  After each B has made the
asset purchase decision for that period, the asset value will be revealed and we continue as
described above.  The coin flip will be repeated and observed by the S’s; B’s will once again
choose whether to purchase information about the asset value and whether or not to purchase
the asset. An account record sheet will be provided to each person, to facilitate personal
record-keeping, if desired.
The number of periods (N) is uncertain and will be determined in the following manner:  There
will be at least 10 periods.  After period 10, we will roll an eight-sided die.  If the die comes up28
3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8, we will continue for another period.  At the end of that period, we will again
roll the die.  Once again, there will be another period if the die comes up 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8.
This process will continue until the die is rolled after a round and comes up 1 or 2, at which
point the experiment will be over.  At any time after period 10, the expected number of further
periods is 4. (A mathematical proof of this will be provided upon request.)29
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APPENDIX 3 - RESULTS
Session 1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Truthful reporting
1+ b+b b+b n b b+b b+b b+b b+b 6/6
2- n n b-n n n b-n b-n b-n b-n 5/5
3+ b+b b+b n b n b n n n b b+b 3/3
4- n b b-n n b b+b b-n n b b-n 3/4
5- b-n b-n b-n b-n b+b b-n b-n 6/7
6+ b+b b+b n b b+b n n b+b b+b 5/5
7+ b+b b+b n b b+b n b b+b b+b 5/5
8- b+b b-n n b b+b n b b-n b-n 3/5
9+ n b b+b b+b n n n b b+b b+b 4/4
10- b-n b+b b+b n n n n b-n b-n 3/5
11+ b+b n b n b n b n n b+b b+b 3/3
12+ b+b n n n n b+b n b b+b b+b 4/4
13- b-n n n b-n n n n n b+n b-n 3/4
Key to reading this chart:  The first column is the period, with the + or - after it indicating a
high or low true asset value.  The data for each pair in each period is in a triplet.  The 1st
element, b or n, indicates whether the buyer bought information in that period.  The middle
element is either + or - indicates the announcement made by the information seller; if no
information was purchased, this is a blank space.  The third element, b or n, indicates whether
the buyer purchased the asset in that period.
Session 2
1 2 3 4 5 6 Truthful reporting
1- b+b b-n b-n n n b-n b+b 3/5
2- b-n b-n b-n b+b b-n b-n 5/6
3+ b+b n b b+b n b n b b+b 3/3
4+ b+b b-n b+b b+b n b b+b 4/5
5- b+b n n b-n n n b-n b-n 3/4
6- n b b+b b-n n n n b b-n 2/3
7+ b+b n n b+b n b b+b n n 3/3
8- b+b n n b+b n b b-n b+b 1/4
9- n b n b b-n n b b-n b-n 3/3
10+ n b n n b+b b+b n n n b 2/2
11- n b n b b+b n b b-n n b 1/2
12- b-n n n n b n n b-n n b 2/23132
Session 3
1 2 3 4 5 6 Truthful reporting
1+ n b b+b n b n b b+b b+b 3/3
2- n n b-n n b b-n b-n b-n 4/4
3+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b 6/6
4- b+n b+b b+b b-n b-n b-n 3/6
5- n b n b n b b-n b-n b-n 3/3
6- n b b-n b+b n b n b b-n 2/3
7+ n b b+b n b b-n b-n b+b 2/4
8+ n b b+b n b n b b+b b+b 3/3
9- n n b-n n n b+b b-b b-n 3/4
10- b-n b-n b+b n n b-n b-n 4/5
11- n n b-n n b n b n n b-n 2/2
12- b+b b-n n b n b n n b-n 2/3
Session 4
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Truthful reporting
1- b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n b-b b-n b-n 8/8
2- b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n n n b-n 7/7
3+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b 8/8
4+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b 8/8
5+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b 8/8
6- b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n b+b n n b-n 6/7
7- b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n b-n n n b-n 7/7
8- b-n b-n b-n b-n b+b b+b b-n n n 5/7
9+ b+b b+b b+b b+b n b n b n b b+b 5/5
10- b-n b-n b-n b-n  n n n b n n b-n 5/5
11+ b+b b+b b+b b+b n b b+b b+b b+b 7/7
12+ b+b b+b b+b b+b n n b+b n b b+b 6/6
13+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b 8/8
14+ b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b b+b n b b+b 7/733
Session 5
1 2 3 4 Truthful reporting
1+ b+b b+b n b n b 2/2
2- b-n b+b n b n b 1/2
3- n b n b n b n b 0/0
4+ n n n b n b b+b 1/1
5+ n n n b n b n b 0/0
6+ b+b n b n n n b 1/1
7+ n b n n n n n b 0/0
8+ n b n n n b n b 0/0
9- n n n b n n n b 0/0
10- n b n b n n n b  0/0
11- n b n b n n n b 0/0
12- n b n b n n n b 0/0
13+ n n n b n b n b 0/0
Session 6
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Truthful reporting
1+ b+b b+b n b n b b+b n b n b n b 3/3
2+ b+b b+b n n b+b b+b n b b+b b+b 6/6
3+ b+b b+n b+b n b b+b n n b+n n n 5/5
4+ b+b b+n b+b n b b+b n n b+b b+b 6/6
5- b-n n n b-n n b b-b n n b-n n n 4/4
6+ b+b n b b-n n b b+b n b b+b b+b 4/5
7+ b+b b+b n b b+b b+b n-n b+b n b 5/5
8+ b+n b+n b-n n-n b+b n b b+n b+n 5/6
9- b-n b-n n b n b b-n n n b-n b-n 5/5
10- b-n b-n n b n b  b-n n n b-n b-n 5/5
11- b-n b-n b-n n b b+b n n b-n b-n 5/6
12+ b+b b+b n b n b n n n b b+b n b 3/3
13- b-n b-n n b n b n n n n b-n b-n 4/4
14+ b+b b+b b+b n b n n n n b+b b+b 5/5
15+ b+n b+n b+n n b n b n n b+n b+n 5/5
16- b-n b-n b+b n n n b n n b+b b-n 3/5
17+ b+b b+b n b n b n b n n n b n n 2/2
18- b-n b-n n b n n n b n n n b b+b 2/334
APPENDIX 4
TRUTHFUL REPORTING WHEN THE ASSET VALUE IS LOW









































































The numbers in parentheses indicate the aggregations of the number of buyers who could have
purchased information.35
FIGURE 1
V = -1 is the low asset  value; V = 1 is the high asset value.  S = -1 is the signal that the asset
value is low; S = 1 is the signal that the asset value is high.  p is the price of information, q is
the bonus for the seller, and  r/2 is the price of the asset, with a high value of r and a low value
of 0.   Bi means buy information, Ni means don't buy information; Ba  means buy the asset, Na
means don't buy the asset.  b is the buyer and s is the seller.  The dotted lines indicate that the
buyer does not know the true asset value when deciding to buy either information or the asset.